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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 1170, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF 
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3449 
TOWN OF GREECE, 
Employer. 
LIPSITZ, GREEN, FAHRINGER, ROLL, SALISBURY & CAMBRIA 
(ROBERT J. REDEN of counsel), for Petitioner 
HARTER, SECREST & EMERY (PETER G. SMITH and 
MARGARET C. CALLANAN of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions of the Town of Greece 
(Town) and Local 1170, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO 
(CWA) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). 
CWA seeks to represent a unit consisting of the following 
titles: Town Clerk, Receiver of Taxes, Fire Marshal, Director of 
Youth Services, Building Inspector, Assessor, Library Director, 
and Director of Parks and Recreation. 
The Director held that the Receiver of Taxes, an elected 
official of the Town, is not a public employee covered by the 
Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) because the incumbent 
of an elected office does not hold a position "by appointment or 
j 
employment in the service of a public employer" as required by 
Board - C-3449 -2 
§201.7(a) of the Act. CWA excepts to this aspect of the 
Director's decision, which the Town endorses as the correct 
interpretation of the Act. The Director held that the incumbents 
of the other titles are covered employees, rejecting the Town's 
arguments that they are either managerial or confidential within 
the meaning of §201.7(a) of the Act. The Town excepts to the 
Director's decision in these respects, which CWA argues should be 
affirmed. 
In its exceptions, the Town alleges that the positions of 
Director of Parks and Recreation and Director of Youth Services 
were abolished in 1992, after the record was closed and after the 
parties had filed their briefs with the Director. The functions 
of the departments headed by those titles were allegedly 
transferred to a new Department of Human Services headed by a 
Director of Human Services, which the Town submits is not a 
position in issue. CWA argues that the positions of Director of 
Parks and Recreation and Director of Youth Services should be 
considered vacant and included in its unit and it seeks a remand 
regarding the coverage and uniting of the Director of Human 
Services. 
We believe that the issues raised in the above noted 
respects warrant a remand for further investigation. In the 
context of this representation proceeding, it is appropriate that 
we investigate, within reason, the limited new facts which bear 
upon the disposition of the representation questions and CWA's 
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possible certification.-' A proper disposition of the 
representation questions in this case necessitates information as 
to whether the positions of Director of Parks and Recreation and 
Director of Youth Services have been abolished or merely left 
vacant. Information received in this respect may affect the 
definition of the appropriate bargaining unit. There is no 
record evidence regarding the duties of the Director of Human 
Services because the title did not exist when the petition was 
filed and the hearings were held. For that reason, and because 
the Director of Human Services is assertedly intended to replace 
the director positions which were covered by CWA's petition as 
filed, we hold that CWA's petition can be deemed amended to 
incorporate that latter-created title. Accordingly, information 
about that position is necessary to determine coverage and 
appropriate uniting. 
Any decision we would issue in response to the parties7 
exceptions would not be dispositive of the representation 
questions, would not be final for purposes of appeal, nor could 
CWA be certified pursuant to it. Therefore, we would not 
expedite the processing of this case by reaching the parties' 
other exceptions at this time. In such circumstances, we believe 
there is no reason to issue an interim decision on those 
exceptions. The exceptions as filed, and such other exceptions 
-^See, e.g., Auburn Industrial Development Auth., 15 PERB f3139 
(1982) . 
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as may be filed pursuant to a decision on remand, may be raised 
to us at the appropriate later date. 
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that the case 
is remanded to the Director for investigation of the issues 
raised since the close of the record regarding the three named 
director positions and for the preparation of such decision as is 
then appropriate. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella; Chairperson 
Walter Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric J/. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHERRILL POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12251 
CITY OP SHERRILL, 
Respondent. 
DePERNO, KHANZADIAN & McGRATH (KAREN KHANZADIAN 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK (JOHN T. McCANN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Sherrill to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a 
charge filed against the City by the Sherrill Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA). After hearing, the ALJ held that the City 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally designated a hearing officer to hear 
the disciplinary charges which the City had instituted against a 
unit employee pursuant to Civil Service Law (CSL) §75. 
The City argues in its exceptions that it did not make any 
change in the unit employees' terms and conditions of employment 
and that the PBA waived any right to bargain the designation of a 
CSL §75 hearing officer. The City also alleges that the ALJ made 
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certain factual errors which contributed to her allegedly 
erroneous conclusion of law. The PBA argues in response that the 
ALT'S decision is factually and legally correct in all material 
respects and should, therefore, be affirmed. 
The ALT properly treated this charge as a unilateral change 
case and it is in that context which we must review the ALT's 
decision and the parties7 arguments concerning it. For the 
reasons set forth below, we must reverse the ALT's decision on 
the basis of the City's first exception. 
CSL §75 prohibits the removal or discipline of certain civil 
service employees, including those in the PBA's unit, except for 
reasons of incompetency or misconduct "shown after a hearing". 
CSL §75 provides that the hearing "shall be held by the officer 
or body having the power to remove the person against whom such 
charges are preferred, or by a deputy or other person designated 
by such officer or body . . . ." 
No unit employee had ever been disciplined pursuant to 
CSL §75 or any other procedure until the hearing which 
precipitated the PBA's charge against the City. The City 
Manager, who is the removing authority for purposes of CSL §75, 
designated a local attorney to act as the CSL §75 hearing 
officer. The PBA objected to the City Manager's designation of a 
hearing officer and demanded negotiations on a procedure for the 
selection of a hearing officer. Despite the PBA's demand, the 
CSL §75 hearing proceeded before the City's designee, who 
recommended the employee's discharge. 
Board - U-12251 -3 
The term and condition of employment in this case which is 
insulated from the City's unilateral change is the utilization of 
CSL §75 to define the grounds and procedures for the imposition 
of discipline. By designating a hearing officer as CSL §75 
permits, the City maintained that term and condition of 
employment consistent with its statutory duty to bargain. The 
fact that it apparently had not been necessary previously to 
invoke CSL §75 does not give rise to a duty to bargain its 
invocation in a particular case. If we were to accept the ALJ's 
decision that the City's selection of a hearing officer in 
accordance with that statute was a mandatorily negotiable 
unilateral change, it would, as a matter of logic, equally 
prohibit the removing authority from serving as the CSL §75 
hearing officer without prior negotiations with the PBA. 
Our decision in this case is entirely consistent with our 
decision in Incorporated Village of Hempstead upon which the ALJ 
relied.-7 In that case, an allegation was made that the 
employer had a long established practice of appointing only 
hearing officers in CSL §75 cases such that its use of the 
removing authority to conduct a hearing arguably violated that 
practice. In such circumstances, the employees' term and 
condition of employment was a modified CSL §75 procedure. Had it 
not been for that alleged practice, we would have dismissed the 
1719 PERB ^3002 (1986), conf'd, 137 A.D.2d 378, 21 PERB [^7013 (3d 
Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 72 N.Y.2d 808, 21 PERB 
1[7018 (1988) . 
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charge in Incorporated Village of Hempstead, as our decision in 
that case specifically states.-7 Accordingly, we remanded the 
case to the ALJ to take evidence on the existence of the past 
practice.-7 
In this case, there is no practice which might be argued to 
have modified the statutory CSL §75 procedures and it is, 
therefore, those statutory procedures which constitute the 
employees' terms and conditions of employment with respect to 
disciplinary procedures. Until there is an agreement or an 
identifiable past practice modifying CSL §75,-7 it is the 
procedures in that statute which the employees are entitled to 
have maintained and the City is entitled to utilize. Therefore, 
the City's appointment and use of a hearing officer pursuant to 
CSL §75 maintained the employees' terms and conditions of 
employment and did not violate the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's first exception 
is granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed.-7 
2719 PERB ^3002 at 3005. 
-
70n remand, the ALJ found that there was a consistent practice 
of using hearing officers and she found a violation of the Act on 
that basis. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 22 PERB 54522 
(1989) . 
-
7CSL §75 alternatives are mandatorily negotiable. See, e.g. , 
Auburn Police Local 195 v. Helsby, 62 A.D.2d 12, 11 PERB 57003 
(3d Dep't 1978), aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 1034, 12 PERB 57006 (1979). 
-
7In view of our holding, it is unnecessary for us to reach the 
City's remaining exceptions. 
Board - U-12251 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
^S v\\<C/ 
Pauline R. Kinsella 
\SL. 
Chairperson 
Walt©*: L. Eisenberg, Member V-
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, CASE NO. DR-031 
Upon a Petition For Declaratory Ruling 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, pro se 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN of counsel), 
for COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and SUFFOLK COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Richard W. 
Glasheen to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). 
In August 1991, Glasheen applied to the Director for a 
determination that the Suffolk County Community College (College) 
is his sole employer. Glasheen argued to the Director, and again 
in his exceptions, that Genesee Community College and County of 
Genesee,^ in which we held a joint-employer relationship to 
exist as a matter of law between a community college and its 
county sponsor, was wrongly decided or is inapplicable to his 
employment at the College. 
The Director treated Glasheen's application as a petition 
for a declaratory ruling pursuant to §210 of our Rules of 
1 7 24 PERB 53 017 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
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Procedure (Rules).-' He then dismissed the petition on the 
ground that the declaratory ruling procedures permit, in relevant 
part, only a limited determination as to whether the Act is 
applicable to a particular person, group or entity. The Director 
determined that the Act is applicable to Glasheen whether he is 
employed by the College, the County of Suffolk (County), or 
jointly by both. He dismissed the petition because he believed 
that the existing declaratory ruling procedures do not allow for 
a determination as to the specific identity of the public 
employer of a public employee. 
Glasheen first argues that the Director erred-7 by treating 
his application as a petition for a declaratory ruling. Contrary 
to Glasheen's belief otherwise, §210 of the Rules is our only 
basis for the issuance of a declaratory ruling.-7 Had the 
Director not treated Glasheen's application as a petition for a 
declaratory ruling, there would have been no means by which his 
petition could have been processed. Therefore, no error can be 
ascribed to the Director for invoking the only procedure which 
enabled him to consider Glasheen's application. 
-
7A declaratory ruling petition did not then have to be filed on 
a form available for that purpose. Section 210.1(a) of the Rules 
has since been amended to require the petition to be on a form 
prescribed by the Director. 
-
7In their response, the County and the College urge affirmance 
of the Director's decision for the reasons he stated. 
-''Section 2 04 of the State Administrative Procedure Act 
authorizes, but does not require, an agency to issue declaratory 
rulings pursuant to the agency's prescribed rules. 
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We also hold that the Director properly dismissed Glasheen's 
petition. Section 210 of our Rules was intended, in relevant 
part, only to permit us to determine whether individuals are 
public employees or whether a particular entity is a public 
employer. In short, §210 of the Rules exists only to answer 
basic questions regarding the Act's coverage. Glasheen is 
admittedly a public employee of a public employer regardless of 
the specific identity of that public employer and he is 
unquestionably covered by the Act. Therefore, his petition does 
not raise any question as to the applicability of the Act to him 
within the meaning and intent of §210 of the Rules. We may not 
process his application further once having determined the Act is 
applicable to him. Therefore, we have no occasion to reach the 
rest of his exceptions, which are directed to his claim that the 
College is his sole employer. 
Glasheen's application raises arguable questions as to 
whether our declaratory ruling procedures should be amended to 
encompass the type of more particularized coverage determination 
he requests. We recognize that there may be significant 
differences of opinion in that respect. This all the more 
persuades us that rather than effectively amend the Rules in the 
context of any particular case, where a change in the Rules is 
warranted, it should be done in accordance with the State 
Board - DR-031 -4 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)-7 under which all affected 
parties can be given an opportunity to comment. 
For the reasons set forth above, Glasheen's exceptions are 
denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
-
7Such a change arguably must be done under APA §2 02 (McKinney 
1984 and Supp. 1992). 
2 D - 0 8 / ? 5 / 9 2 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW BERLIN FACULTY ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12502 
NEW BERLIN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Party 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING (R. DANIEL BORDONI of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New Berlin 
Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the 
New Berlin Faculty Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association). The Association alleges that the District 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed its practice of 
extending by one day the Memorial Day holiday if the snow or 
emergency day allotment for a school year had not been exhausted 
as of that holiday date. 
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On a stipulated record, the ALT dismissed the §209-a.l(a) 
allegation,-7 but he found that the District had violated 
§2 09-a.l(d) of the Act as alleged. The ALT held that the 
District's practice of extending the Memorial Day holiday was 
conditioned only upon there being unused snow or emergency days. 
That condition was satisfied in 1991 and, therefore, the 
District's refusal to continue its practice of giving unit 
employees the additional paid holiday, a mandatory subject of 
negotiation, violated its duty to bargain. 
The District in its exceptions argues that the decision to 
grant the additional holiday was reserved to the board of 
education's discretion, which it exercised annually in 
conjunction with school calendar decisions. It also argues that 
the Association',s charge concerns a school calendar decision 
which is not mandatorily negotiable.-7 Therefore, according to 
the District, there can be no violation of its duty to bargain 
even assuming we were to find a practice of granting an 
additional paid holiday to exist. It further argues that the 
charge is not within our jurisdiction under §205.5(d) of the 
Act,-7 that the Association waived any bargaining rights in 
relevant respect, and that the ALT's remedial order is inappropriate. 
-
7No exceptions have been filed to this aspect of the ALT's 
decision. 
g/West Babylon Public Schools. 11 PERB 53012 (1978) . 
-
7That section of the Act deprives us of jurisdiction over 
alleged violations of an agreement not otherwise constituting an 
improper practice. 
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The Association argues in response that the ALJ's decision 
is correct and that his remedial order is appropriate. 
Having reviewed the stipulated record and considered the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The Association satisfied its burden of proof regarding the 
holiday practice by showing that for eleven years prior to 1991, 
employees were given an additional holiday whenever there were 
unused snow or emergency days.-7 It was then the District's 
burden to establish that the annual grant of that paid holiday 
was further conditioned upon the exercise of the board of 
education's discretion. The only proof of the condition alleged 
to exist are the board of education's resolutions regarding the 
holiday which issued in only seven of the last eleven years. In 
four school years, including the one immediately preceding the 
year in issue, the practice continued without any resolution from 
the board of education. Under these circumstances, we do not 
consider the holiday extension to have been conditioned 
invariably upon an annual approval by the board of education. 
The District's exception which is directed to the 
negotiability of the holiday is also without merit. Paid 
holidays are mandatorily negotiable subjects notwithstanding the 
-'State of New York (Division of Military and Naval Affairs), 
24 PERB 1[3024 (1991) (appeal pending) ; Schuylerville Cent. School 
Dist., 14 PERB H3035 (1981). 
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ramifications those subjects may have upon the instructional 
calendar.-' 
As to the District's jurisdictional defense, there is 
nothing in the stipulated record to establish that the contract 
contains any provision which is a source of right to the 
Association in any relevant respect.-'' Therefore, there is no 
basis to hold that we are without jurisdiction over the charge. 
The stipulated record at most would support an arguable defense 
of waiver by agreement in that the parties7 contract fixes the 
length of the work year at 185 days, which was not exceeded by 
the teachers working on May 24, 1991.-1 Consideration of that 
-
7There may have been a compelling need for the teachers' 
presence as we recognized in similar circumstances in Cohoes City 
School Dist., 12 PERB f3113 (1979). In that case, however, 
unlike here, the employer had bargained with the union to impasse 
over the change in the teachers' workday. Had the District in 
this case elected to bargain its decision to deny the employees 
an extra holiday, it is conceivable that classes could have 
continued on May 24 with the teachers present even if there were 
no agreement with the Association on the holiday issue. 
^County of Nassau, 23 PERB 53051 (1990). 
-/This particular contract language is recited in the District's 
answer which is part of the record. However, the contract itself 
is not part of the record and the parties' written stipulation 
does not refer to any contract provisions. The ALJ's letter to 
the parties which establishes the record states that a decision 
will issue on the facts "as set forth in your stipulation." We 
assume for purposes of this appeal that those portions of the 
Association's charge and the District's answer which were not 
modified by the parties' stipulation were incorporated into that 
stipulation. Therefore, we reach the waiver defense based upon 
the length of the work year. Article VI of the parties' 
contract, which is referred to in the District's brief on appeal, 
cannot, however, be considered part of the record on any theory. 
Therefore, we do not consider any arguments which are based on 
that contract provision. 
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waiver defense lies plainly within our jurisdiction. 
In that respect, the District argues that our decision in 
Maine-Endwell Central School District (hereafter Maine-
Endwell)-7 requires the dismissal of the charge. We disagree. 
In affirming the AKT's decision in Maine-Endwell,-' we held only 
that a unilateral increase in the length of class periods did not 
violate the Act because that increase in instructional work time 
was within the limit of the workday as fixed by the parties7 
contract. 
The District argues that Maine-Endwell applies in this case 
because the unit employees were' not worked beyond the contract's 
maximum 185 days. The District's interpretation of Maine-Endwell 
is incorrect because it would deny a union any right to bargain 
any issue associated with the length of the work year. Maine-
Endwell , properly construed, does not give the District the right 
to unilaterally abolish a particular paid holiday which has been 
observed for years. The District's obtained right to have its 
employees work a specific number of days of work within a year 
does not also give it the unilateral right to rescind a long-
standing paid holiday. The District's right is to require a 
maximum number of days of work by its employees in a year, not to 
control the period within which the maximum is reached through a 
manipulation or cancellation of observed holidays. 
2/15 PERB 53025 (1982) . 
2/14 PERB 54625 (1981) . 
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We do not reach any of the District's arguments regarding 
its impact bargaining obligations because the Association's 
charge rests on a unilateral change in a noncontractual practice, 
not a refusal to bargain the impact of the change pursuant to 
demand. 
Having held that the decision to deny unit employees the 
paid holiday they had enjoyed for years violated the District's 
duty to bargain, we turn to a consideration of the AKT's remedy. 
The ALJ ordered restoration of the practice and payment to the 
employees of one extra day's pay for the day they were required 
to work. The Association was not required to prove any damages, 
because we do not require such proof in our proceedings. In any 
event, the damages in this case are self-evident and certain. 
Although the unit employees were paid for the day they were 
required to work, it is appropriate that they be paid extra for 
that day because they would have been paid for the holiday 
without working. Restoration of the status quo is equally 
appropriate. The order restoring the holiday practice does not 
prevent the District from setting or changing a school calendar 
in accordance with its managerial prerogatives. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Forthwith pay any unit employee who worked on 
Friday before the Memorial Day holiday in 1991, 
the equivalent of one additional day's pay at the 
Board - U-12502 -7 
3. 
employee's applicable rate for the day, with 
interest thereon at the maximum legal rate. 
Forthwith restore for unit employees its 
prior practice with respect to extending the 
Memorial Day holiday by one day. 
Sign and post the attached notice at all 
locations normally used to communicate with 
unit employees. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
PauLine R. Kinsella, ? Chairperson 
Walter/L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/j. Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all emloyees represented by the New Berlin Faculty 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, that the New Berlin Central 
School District will: 
1. Forthwith pay any unit employee who worked on Friday 
before the Memorial Day holiday in 1991, the equivalent 
of one additional day's pay at the employee's 
applicable rate for the day, with interest thereon at 
the maximum legal rate. 
2. Forthwith restore for unit employees its prior practice 
with respect to extending the Memorial Day holiday by 
one day. 
NEW BERLIN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered. 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUTCHESS COUNTY BOCES FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-246 
DUTCHESS COUNTY BOARD OF COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
Employer. 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD, GENERAL COUNSEL (HAROLD G. BEYER, JR., 
of counsel), for Petitioner 
ANDERSON, BANKS, CURRAN & DONOGHUE (JOHN M. DONOGHUE of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Dutchess 
County Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). The Director placed teaching 
assistants into the unit represented by the Dutchess County BOCES 
Faculty Association (Association) on a finding that the teaching 
assistants had a substantial community of interest with the 
teachers and the other allied professional personnel in the 
Association's unit, notwithstanding the teachers7 role in 
evaluating the teaching assistants' job performance. 
BOCES' main argument on appeal is that the teachers' 
evaluation of the teaching assistants creates both a potential 
Board - CP-246 -2 
and actual conflicts of interest so great as to preclude the unit 
placement made by the Director. BOCES also argues that the 
teaching assistants do not share a community of interest with the 
other unit employees sufficient to warrant their placement in the 
Association's existing unit. 
The Association argues in its response that the Director was 
correct in concluding that the teaching assistants have a 
community of interest with others in the Association's unit at 
least as great as that shared by the teacher aides who have been 
in the unit for many years.-7 The Association also argues that 
the teachers' evaluation of the teaching assistants poses no 
actual or potential conflicts sufficient to preclude the 
placement ordered by the Director. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' briefs and 
having heard oral argument, we affirm the Director's decision. 
BOCES contends that no unit can be found most appropriate 
which includes both evaluators and evaluatees because that 
uniting inherently poses too great a potential for conflicts of 
interest. We reject that per se exclusion. The argument merely 
recasts a per se supervisory exclusion rule which, as the 
Director correctly observed, the Board rejected in one of its 
very first uniting cases.-' The Board has repeatedly stressed 
-'Teaching assistants are instructional personnel; teacher aides 
are not. 
g/New York State Div. of State Police, 1 PERB ^[399.32 (1968). 
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since that decision that it is the nature and degree of the 
supervisory authority actually being exercised by a supervisor 
over a subordinate, not a supervisory status itself, that is 
relevant to the determination of the appropriate unit.-7 The 
Director considered the teachers' role in the evaluation of the 
teaching assistants in the context of one of his recent decisions 
involving teaching assistants.-'' He concluded that the teachers 
merely provide others in BOCES' administration, who are 
responsible for employment decisions, with information about the 
teaching assistants in five designated areas.-7 The Director 
held that the teachers and teaching assistants have a close, 
cooperative, professional relationship, not characterized by the 
type of traditional supervisor-subordinate conflicts which might 
warrant exclusion of the teaching assistants from the 
Association's unit. 
We consider the Director to have properly characterized the 
teachers' and the teaching assistants' relationship and hold, as 
did he, that it is not one which is either inherently or 
factually incompatible with the assistants being placed into the 
^See Uniondale Union Free School Dist. . 21 PERB [^3060 (1988) . 
^Clinton-Essex-Warren-Washincrton BOCES, 24 PERB [^4030 (1991) . 
-''Teachers are asked to assess the assistants' rapport, poise, 
knowledge, teaching ability and control of student behavior. 
There is a dispute as to the extent to which the teachers are 
actually asked these questions. We need not resolve that dispute 
and will assume for purposes of this decision that all teachers 
who are assigned a teaching assistant .are asked for input in each 
of these areas. 
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same unit as the teachers. We do not share BOCES' view that it 
is unit placement, in and of itself, that would inhibit a 
teacher's objective evaluation of a teaching assistant. It is 
the close working relationship between the teacher and his or her 
assistant which is likely to influnece the teacher's evaluation, 
a factor entirely independent of any particular unit 
configuration. 
We have reviewed each of the decisions which BOCES has 
relied upon in its brief and during oral argument before us and 
find them all to be readily distinguishable from this case. In 
each, there was a much broader range of supervisory functions 
being performed than in this case.-7 Arlington Central School 
District (hereafter Arlington),-/ the decision BOCES relies upon 
the most, is typical of the others which are equally inapposite. 
In Arlington, the Director determined that certain elementary 
teacher assistants to the principal should be placed in an 
administrative unit, not the teachers' unit. The teacher 
assistants in that case were not instructional teaching 
assistants as are the teaching assistants in this case. Rather, 
the incumbents of the at-issue positions in Arlington were former 
full-time or part-time administrators who continued to perform a 
-
7See, e.g., Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City 
of New York. 15 PERB 114074, aff'd, 15 PERB f3138 (1982); Mineola 
Union Free School Dist. , 7 PERB U[4033 (1974) ; East Meadow Union 
Free School Dist. . 6 PERB 5(4027 (1973) ; City School Dist. of the 
City of White Plains. 1 PERB [^433 (1968) . 
z/10 PERB f4056 (1977) . 
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full range of administrative functions in their teacher assistant 
title. Arlington did not rest upon a conflict of interest 
stemming from the teacher assistants' evaluation of teachers. 
Arlington simply represents the Director's determination in that 
case that the elementary teacher assistants to the principal had 
a greater community of interest with the administrators than with 
the teachers. 
BOCES' community of interest arguments require little 
comment. The teaching assistants plainly have at least as much 
of a community of interest with the teachers and others in the 
Association's unit as do the teacher aides who have been in the 
Association's unit for many years. There are, as BOCES alleges, 
differences between teachers and teaching assistants in certain 
educational requirements, certain job assignments and supervisory 
hierarchy.^ These, however, are no more significant to the 
teaching assistants' placement into the Association's unit than 
were the employment differences in the cases in which it was 
determined that teaching assistants were most appropriately 
grouped with teachers and other allied educational personnel.-'' 
-''Teaching assistants are not required under the Commissioner of 
Education's regulations to have a college degree and they do not 
participate, to the same degree as the teachers, in the 
development of educational programs for handicapped students. To 
the extent teaching assistants are supervised by teachers, the 
teaching assistants are subject to one more layer of supervision 
than are the teachers. 
g/Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES
 f 23 PERB ?[3014 (1991) ; 
Whitesboro Cent. School Dist. , 11 PERB ?[4043 (1978) . 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and BOCES' exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the position of teaching 
assistant be placed into the negotiating unit of BOCES' employees 
currently represented by the Association. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Yy\^X. CA *&4\ I <L 
Pauline R. Kmse l la , Chairperson 
Waited L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORANGE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-276 
COUNTY OF ORANGE and SHERIFF OF 
ORANGE COUNTY, 
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WILSON & FRANZBLAU (KENNETH J. FRANZBLAU of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
PROSKAUER ROSE GOETZ & MENDELSOHN (KATHLEEN M. McKENNA of 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Orange 
County Deputy Sheriffs Association, Inc. (OCDSA) to a decision by 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) on a unit clarification petition. OCDSA seeks a 
determination that nondeputed personnel in the Sheriff's 
Department are not in its unit. 
The Director declined to make the unit clarification 
requested by OCDSA, primarily on the ground that we had already 
decided the fact question raised by the petition in our decision 
on an improper practice charge OCDSA filed against the County of 
Orange and Sheriff of Orange County (County) i'. In that 
-
7County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange Countyf 25 PERB [^3004 
(1992) . 
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decision, we found that OCDSA represented a unit of all Sheriff's 
Department personnel, not just the sworn deputy sheriffs as 
claimed by OCDSA. We held, therefore, that the County violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it recognized the County of Orange Correction Officers 
Benevolent Association (COBA) as the bargaining agent for OCDSA's 
unit. In a separate representation proceeding, we ordered an 
election in the existing unit.-7 The pendency of that election 
was an additional reason the Director declined to make any unit 
clarification. COBA received a majority of the valid votes cast 
in that election-7 and, accordingly, we have this date certified 
COBA as the bargaining agent for the existing unit. 
OCDSA argues in its exceptions that the Director erred in 
declining to process its unit clarification petition, while the 
County responds that the Director's decision is correct. We 
affirm the Director's decision. 
OCDSA's unit clarification petition raises only a fact 
question as to whether nondeputed personnel are included in its 
existing unit.-7 The petition was not filed for unit placement 
which would have raised a uniting question. As the Director 
g/County of Orancre and Sheriff of Orange County, 25 PERB f3021 
(1992) . 
-
7From 283 eligible voters, COBA received 192 votes, 
OCDSA received 49, and 3 votes were cast in favor of neither 
union. 
^State of New York (Dep't of Audit and Control) , 24 PERB fl3 019 
(1991). 
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correctly observed, we have already decided the fact question 
raised by the unit clarification petition adversely to OCDSA in 
our earlier decision on its improper practice charge against the 
County. 
Even were we to treat OCDSA's clarification petition as one 
for unit placement, we would dismiss it. As the name itself 
implies, a unit placement petition may not be used by a 
petitioner to fragment its own existing unit. Fragmentation of 
the type sought by OCDSA raises representation questions which 
are most appropriately decided within the context of our 
procedures for certification/decertification. 
For the reasons set forth above, OCDSA7s exceptions are 
denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
tU-K^ A. 4-~- MAVW (•*. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MemBer 
Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED SCHOOL WORKERS OF MAHOPAC, 
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-and- CASE NO. U-12155 
MAHOPAC CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
RICHARD CASTELLITTO, for Charging Party 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United 
School Workers of Mahopac (USWOM) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, the ALJ 
dismissed USWOM7s charge against the Mahopac Central School 
District (District) which alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally implemented a no-smoking policy. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge, filed on December 20, 1990, as 
untimely. The smoking policy in issue, adopted on March 13, 
1990, banned indoor smoking at least by April 1, 1990, and 
outdoor smoking effective September 1, 1990. The ALJ held that 
the occasions before September 1990 on which unit employees 
violated the indoor smoking ban without consequence, USWOM7s 
alleged confusion about the meaning and application of the 
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smoking policy, and the contemporaneous contract negotiations, in 
which both parties had smoking proposals, did not affect the 
computation of the period within which USWOM could file a charge 
contesting the smoking policy. The ALT established the 
beginning of the filing period at April 1, 1990, finding that 
USWOM's charge did not challenge the smoking ban as it applied to 
outdoor smoking effective September 1, 1990. 
USWOM alleges in its exceptions that there was a more 
pervasive pattern of noncompliance with the smoking policy which 
was known to District agents than was related by the ALJ in his 
decision. USWOM would fix the implementation date of the indoor 
smoking ban in September 199 0, at the earliest, when building 
principals made concerted efforts to prohibit employees from 
smoking. USWOM also alleges that it challenged the ban on 
outdoor smoking and that its December 20, 1990 charge is timely, 
at least insofar as it concerns the outdoor smoking ban. The 
District, in its response, argues that the ALJ's decision is a 
reasoned distillation of the record evidence, properly reflects 
the scope of the charge, and is a correct application of the 
controlling case law regarding timeliness.-7 It urges, 
therefore, that the ALJ's decision be affirmed. 
The District's smoking policy as announced on March 13, 
199 0, was plain and clear by its terms. The indoor smoking ban, 
I*City of Oswego, 23 PERB [^3007 (1990) ; Middle Country Teachers 
Ass'n (Werner) , 21 PERB ?[3012 (1988) . 
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if not effective immediately on promulgation of that policy, was 
implemented no later than April 1, 1990. Having reviewed the 
record, we do not agree with USWOM's contention that the 
instances of observed noncompliance with the indoor smoking ban, 
even as related by USWOM, were of a type or frequency which 
suggested that the effective date of the ban had been rescinded 
or postponed. Therefore, we hold that the ban on indoor smoking 
was effectively implemented no later than April 1, 1990, and, 
therefore, we affirm the AKJ-'s dismissal of that aspect of the 
charge as untimely. 
Left for consideration is whether the charge encompassed an 
allegation regarding the outdoor smoking ban. As we read the 
charge as filed, it challenged both aspects of the District's 
March 13 smoking policy. USWOM may not, as the ALJ observed, 
have litigated the outdoor smoking ban at the hearing, but that 
affects only the adequacy of its proof of violation in that 
respect. It does not establish that USWOM intended to withdraw 
its allegations with respect to the second aspect of the 
District's smoking policy. Therefore, the case must be remanded 
to the ALJ for a decision on the timeliness of this aspect of the 
charge and, if timely, on its substantive merits. 
For the reasons set forth above, the AKT's decision is 
affirmed as to that aspect of the charge regarding the ban on 
indoor smoking, USWOM's exceptions are denied in that respect, 
and the charge in that respect is hereby dismissed. That part of 
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the AU's decision finding the ban on outdoor smoking not to have 
been placed in issue is reversed, USWOM's exceptions in that 
respect are granted, and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case is 
remanded to the AKJ for decision in accordance with the terms of 
our decision herein. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
IhS^tLd.. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter^L. Eisenberg, Memb/r 
Eric J. /Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
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NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to an Administrative Law 
Judge's (AKJ) decision filed by the State of New York (State). 
After a hearing, the AKJ sustained in part and dismissed in part 
a charge filed against the State by the New York State Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF). PEF alleges that the State 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it closed several nursing stations and medical 
examination centers. The AKJ dismissed that part of the charge 
concerning the medical examination centers because he held that 
the decision to close those facilities was not mandatorily 
negotiable. No exceptions have been filed to this part of the 
AKJ's decision. 
In contrast to the medical examination centers, which had 
existed to serve the State's managerial interests, the AKJ found 
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that the nursing stations offered employees two basic types of 
health service: on-site emergency medical treatment on a first 
responder basis and routine nursing care. He held that the 
State's abolition of the first responder service in all of the 
closed nursing facilities violated the Act. Routine nursing care 
was also eliminated at the closed facilities, but the State had 
arranged for alternative routine nursing services in some but not 
all locations. The ALT held that the State did not provide any 
reasonable routine nursing alternative at Brooklyn (Hanson 
Place), Hauppauge and Hornell. The employees who had used the 
nursing station at the Albany State Campus Building #5 were to 
use the station at Campus Building #1 in the same complex, 
approximately one hundred yards from Building #5. When the 
nursing station at Albany SUNY Plaza was closed, employees were 
to use a nursing station on Pearl Street in Albany, approximately 
six blocks, according to the record, from the SUNY Plaza. 
Employees who had used the nursing station at 50 Wolf Road were 
to use the nursing station at the Albany State Campus, 
approximately six miles away. A nursing station at 125 Main 
Street in Buffalo was to substitute for the nursing station at 
Court Street in Buffalo which was closed, but the Main Street 
location was also closed when the assigned nurse resigned her 
position. The ALJ found a violation premised upon the 
elimination of routine nursing care as to all facilities except 
the State Campus, where he held that the State had continued a 
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nursing station for routine care within reasonable proximity to 
the site of the nursing station which was closed. 
The State's exceptions are directed only to certain parts of 
the ALJ's decision. The State argues first that the ALT erred by 
basing certain of his findings on the elimination of first 
responder services at the closed facilities. The State alleges 
that there was no cognizable change in practice in this respect 
because nursing stations were never intended to provide this 
service. The State also excepts to the ALJ's decision that the 
six blocks between the closed nursing station at the Albany SUNY 
Plaza and Pearl Street was too great to make the alternative site 
reasonably proximate. The State excepts also to the ALJ's 
findings regarding the City of Buffalo nursing stations because 
the closing of the Main Street facility, which was intended to 
substitute for the nursing station closed at Court Street, was 
caused by the voluntary resignation of the nurse who was assigned 
to Main Street. The State argues in this respect that another 
ALJ had previously found that nursing station closings caused by 
employee resignations did not violate the Act.-7 The State 
excepts finally to that part of the ALJ's order which requires it 
to reimburse employees for expenses they incurred as a result of 
the elimination of emergency first responder and routine nursing 
care. The State alleges that there is no proof of damage and 
that the order is otherwise inappropriate because there were 
cost-free alternative sites available for the employees7 use. 
^State of New York fDep't of Civ. Serv.), 23 PERB f4514 (1990). 
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PEF argues in response that the record supports the ALT's 
findings of fact, that his conclusions of law are correct and 
that the remedy is appropriate. 
According to the ALT, the employees' mandatorily negotiable 
benefit was the availability of emergency and routine nursing 
care at locations reasonably proximate to the nursing stations 
from which those services had been delivered. The closing of 
certain nursing stations was the method by which unit employees 
were deprived of the benefit. No exceptions have been taken by 
either party to the ALJ's characterization of the benefit or to 
its negotiability and we accept it for purposes of our analysis 
of the State's exceptions. 
In this context, the State's first exception is without 
merit. Whether or not the State intended to offer the service to 
employees, the record shows that emergency nursing care on a 
first responder basis was in fact available for years to 
employees through the nurses at many if not all of the nursing 
stations which were recently closed. The State admittedly 
discontinued that benefit when it closed the nursing stations. 
Any questions regarding the precise nature or extent of those 
first responder services relate to the ALJ's remedy and they can 
be ascertained on compliance review if necessary. 
The ALJ's assessment of the benefit necessitates an 
evaluation of the substantial equivalency of the alternative 
nursing services which the State made available at certain 
locations on a nonemergency basis. Routine nursing care has been 
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relocated to the Pearl Street nursing station for unit employees 
who had used the closed SUNY Plaza, a distance of approximately 
six blocks. The State argues that because there is no evidence 
that this change of nursing station affected the frequency of the 
employees7 use of the nursing services, the ALJ had no basis to 
conclude that the Pearl Street location was not reasonably 
proximate to the nursing station which was formerly at the SUNY 
Plaza. We do not agree. In matters of health care, the distance 
an employee must travel to obtain the medical service is crucial, 
not only the frequency of use. Even if there had been an 
increase or no change in the utilization rate, that would not 
establish reasonable proximity, only the need for and value of 
the service. Alternatively, by the State's own argument, a 
decreased utilization rate would support a conclusion that the 
alternative was not substantially equivalent. PEF unit employees 
who are stationed at the SUNY Plaza are now required to travel 
several blocks in city traffic, exposed to the weather under 
varying conditions of medical distress. At least as to those 
unit employees who work at the SUNY Plaza, we cannot say that the 
nursing service at Pearl Street was reasonably proximate to that 
which was previously available to them. 
We find no more merit in the State's third exception, which 
is directed to the ALJ's finding regarding the closing of the 
nursing station at Court Street in the City of Buffalo. The 
subsequent closing of the nursing station at Main Street in 
Buffalo is not in issue except to the extent the State intended 
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to use the Main Street location as a place where employees who 
had used the Court Street nursing station could go to obtain 
nursing care. The closing of the Main Street location, however, 
did not permit the State to deny nursing services at Court Street 
without substituting some reasonably proximate location. Having 
closed Court Street, it was the State's obligation to continue to 
provide substantially equivalent nursing services at a reasonably 
proximate location. The nurse's resignation at Main Street is 
entirely irrelevant to this issue and nothing in the ALJ's 
decision in State of New York (Dep't of Civil Service) is to the 
contrary. The State was not prevented, for example, from 
replacing the nurse at the Main Street station if it wished to 
make the Main Street station the alternative to the Court Street 
station. Having chosen not to staff the Main Street station, the 
State was obliged to find some other reasonably proximate 
location for nursing services, but it did not. In such 
circumstances, the Buffalo closing is subject to the same 
analysis which led to the ALJ's findings regarding the closings 
of the nursing stations in Brooklyn (Hanson Place), Hauppauge and 
Hornell to which no exceptions have been filed. 
The State's exceptions to the ALJ's remedy are also denied. 
We believe that the identity of persons who are eligible for 
expense reimbursement, their entitlement to that reimbursement, 
and the amount of those reimbursements can be fixed with 
reasonable certainty by personal affidavit and accompanying 
documentation. No proof in this regard was necessary during the 
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hearing, as it is a matter for compliance investigation and 
enforcement.-7 Although certain cost-free nursing alternatives 
were available, none but the one which substituted Building #1 
for Building #5 at the State Campus has been found to be 
reasonably proximate. Employees are not required to use cost-
free alternatives which are remote from the locations at which 
they previously received nursing services. 
For the reasons set forth above, the State's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State: 
1. Forthwith reinstate the same level of first responder 
emergency health services to employees as had been 
provided by the nursing stations located at Buffalo 
(Court Street), Brooklyn (Hanson Place), Hauppauge, 
Hornell, Albany SUNY Plaza, Albany State Campus 
Building #5, and 50 Wolf Road, Albany facilities prior 
to the closing of the nursing stations at those 
locations in January and March 1991. 
2. Forthwith reinstate the same level of nonemergency 
health care and safety services to employees as had 
been provided by the nursing stations located at 
Buffalo (Court Street), Brooklyn (Hanson Place), 
Hauppauge, Hornell, Albany SUNY Plaza, and 50 Wolf 
^County of Broome, 22 PERB 53 019 (1989) ; County of Onondaga, 
24 PERB 53014 (1991) (appeal pending on other issues); State of 
New York (Division of Military and Naval Affairs), 24 PERB 53024 
(1991) (appeal pending). 
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Road, Albany facilities prior to the closing of the 
nursing stations at those locations in January and 
March 1991. 
3. Upon submission of appropriate documentation, reimburse 
unit employees for expenditures, if any, directly 
occasioned by the elimination of the first responder 
service at the nursing stations that were closed in 
January and March 1991 and by the elimination of non-
emergency health and safety services at all nursing 
stations that were closed in January and March 1991, 
except for the Albany State Campus Building #5, with 
interest on any such amounts at the maximum legal rate, 
until such time as such services are restored 
consistent with this decision. 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations used 
to communicate with unit employees in the buildings 
where the at-issue nursing stations had been closed. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
all employees in the units represented by the New York 
State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO that the State of New York 
will: 
1. Forthwith reinstate the same level of first responder 
emergency health services to employees as had been provided 
by the nursing stations located at its Buffalo (Court 
Street), Brooklyn (Hanson Place), Hauppauge, Hornell, Albany 
SUNY Plaza, Albany State Campus Building #5, and 50 Wold 
Road, Albany facilities prior to the closing of the nursing 
stations at those locations in January and March 1991. 
2. Forthwith reinstate the same level of nonemergency health 
care and safety services to employees as had been provided by 
the nursing stations located at Buffalo (Court Street), 
Brooklyn (Hanson Place), Hauppauge, Hornell, Albany SUNY 
Plaza, and 50 Wolf Road, Albany facilities prior to the 
closing of the nursing stations at those locations in January 
._ and March 1991 . 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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TOWN OF RIVERHEAD, 
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-and- CASE NO. U-12 367 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, TOWN OF 
RIVERHEAD UNIT OF LOCAL 852, 
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RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (RICHARD K. ZUCKERMAN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Town of Riverhead Unit of Local 852 (CSEA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed against CSEA by 
the Town of Riverhead (Town). The Town alleges that CSEA 
violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it cancelled negotiating sessions and refused to meet 
with the Town for purposes of negotiating a successor to the 
parties7 collective bargaining agreement which expired on 
December 31, 199 0. The ALJ deemed the material allegations in 
the charge admitted because CSEA failed to file a timely answer 
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and held no hearing as a result.-7 The ALT held that CSEA's 
totality of conduct in conditioning meetings on employees being 
granted paid release time and its last minute cancellations of 
scheduled dates for meetings, unaccompanied by any agreement to 
future dates, evidenced a lack of good faith to reach an 
agreement and was in violation of CSEA's duty to bargain. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ abused her 
discretion in denying it a hearing. It also alleges that the ALJ 
made certain factual errors and that her legal conclusion was 
wrong. CSEA further argues that its resumption of negotiations 
after the charge was filed either moots the charge or evidences 
its good faith. 
The Town argues in response that the ALJ properly denied 
CSEA the opportunity to file a late answer and to participate in 
a hearing on the Town's allegations. It further argues that the 
record supports the ALJ's conclusion that CSEA's conduct before 
the charge was filed violated its duty to bargain. 
The Town's charge was filed on March 18, 1991. According to 
our Rules of Procedure, CSEA's answer or motion to particularize 
was due within ten working days of its receipt of the charge from 
-'Section 204.3(f) of our Rules of Procedure provides as follows: 
If the respondent fails to file a timely answer, such 
failure may be deemed by the administrative law judge 
to constitute an admission of the material facts 
alleged in the charge and a waiver by the respondent of 
a hearing. 
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PERB.-7 No answer had been received by the prehearing 
conference held on July 8, 1991. CSEA's representative at that 
conference informed the AKJ that an answer would not be filed 
because negotiations had resumed. Later in July, CSEA moved for 
leave to file a late answer even though it admitted that "there 
was no dispute to the facts alleged in the charge." CSEA again 
argued to the AKJ that it thought the charge was moot because 
negotiations had resumed in April 1991, but because the Town had 
elected to proceed with the charge, it wanted to answer. The 
Town formally opposed CSEA's request to file a late answer and 
the ALT denied CSEA's request. 
CSEA does not contest the AKJ's decision to deem the 
allegations in the charge admitted because it tiad admitted those 
allegations. It does argue, however, that it was an abuse of the 
ALJ's discretion to deny it a hearing to clarify and explain its 
conduct as admitted, there being no prejudice to the Town if a 
hearing is held. 
Had CSEA filed an answer, it may well have been afforded a 
hearing to explain its admitted actions or to place them in 
context because its good faith or lack thereof is dependent upon 
the totality of circumstances which may include consideration of 
the parties' intent.-7 The issue, however, is not the relevancy 
of its evidence, but whether it was incorrectly denied an 
27Rules of Procedure, §204.3(a) & (b) . 
j/Town of Southampton, 2 PERB 53 011 (19 69) . 
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opportunity to submit that evidence at a hearing. In the 
circumstances of this case, we hold that the ALJ did not abuse 
her discretion in denying CSEA a hearing. 
CSEA's request to file an answer was first made months after 
a response was due, apparently after it had reconsidered its 
prior decision not to file an answer because it did not deem an 
answer necessary. The hearing CSEA seeks is for the purpose of 
defending the allegations of impropriety made in the Town's 
charge. That is, however, precisely one of the purposes to be 
served by the answer. Were we to grant CSEA's request for a 
hearing in this circumstance, we would undermine the purpose of 
the Rules in relevant respect, encourage disrespect and 
noncompliance with them, and simultaneously undercut the 
discretion afforded the ALJ by our Rules and decisions. Although 
sensitive to a party's due process rights, we must be equally 
sensitive to the rights of the other parties and to the public's 
interests in an orderly system of adjudication. Having 
considered the several interests at stake, we cannot conclude 
that the ALJ abused her discretion in denying CSEA permission to 
file a late answer. There being no answer and, therefore, no 
properly raised issues of fact or defense, there is no basis on 
which to require a hearing. Nor can we say there would be no 
prejudice to the Town if we were to reverse the ALJ and grant 
CSEA a hearing under the circumstances of this case. 
CSEA's other exceptions are directed to the ALJ's finding of 
a violation. CSEA argues in this respect that the allegations in 
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the Town's charge as admitted are not sufficient to establish a . 
violation of its duty to bargain. We disagree. The unrebutted 
allegations in the charge establish that CSEA repeatedly 
conditioned its scheduling of bargaining sessions on the Town's 
agreement to hold those sessions on the Town's time,-7 agreed to 
but few dates despite the Town's offer of many, and cancelled 
several scheduled bargaining sessions without explanation, twice 
on the morning of the day the parties were scheduled to meet, and 
otherwise generally made itself unavailable for meetings. 
CSEA argues to us that the Town also violated its duty to 
bargain. However, there are no allegations of impropriety 
pending against the Town and we are, accordingly, unable to 
assess the claims relating to the propriety of the Town's 
bargaining conduct. In any event, even if it were to be 
established that the Town also refused to bargain in good faith, 
that would not excuse CSEA's own refusal to bargain as 
established by the admitted allegations in the charge.-7 
Although CSEA's resumption of negotiations after the charge 
was filed does not moot the charge or establish its good faith 
prior to the filing of that charge, it is a factor relevant to 
the need for any remedial action.-7 The parties having resumed 
^Marcellus Faculty Ass'n, 21 PERB [^3035 (1988) (conditioning of 
substantive negotiations on agreement to procedural ground rule 
held refusal to bargain). 
^
7See City of Schenectady, 21 PERB ?[3022 (1988) . 
-
7S_ee, e. q. , Westchester County Medical Center and Westchester 
County, 13 PERB [^3038 (1980) . 
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negotiations, we find no need to order any remedial relief other 
than a posting of notice of violation. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny CSEA's exceptions, 
and affirm the ALj''s decision to the extent it finds CSEA to have 
violated the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that CSEA post notice in the form 
attached in all locations within the Town in which it ordinarily 
posts notices of information to unit employees. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
lline R. Kmsella, au m Chairperson 
C4AMXZ*2?. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
^^Y^1>tn^ 
Eric 3/ Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Riverhead (Town) in the 
unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association; 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Riverhead Unit of 
Local 852 (CSEA) that CSEA has been found to have violated 
§209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act by 
refusing to negotiate in good faith with the Town. 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, TOWN OF RIVERHEAD 
UNIT OF LOCAL 852 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
2J-08/25/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORWICH FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1404, IAFF, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12332 
CITY OF NORWICH, 
Respondent. 
WYSSLIN6, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY (RUSSELL J. SCIANDRA of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (JAMES W. ROEMER, JR. and 
SCOTT W. GOLLOP of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Norwich (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
on a charge filed against the City by the Norwich Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 1404, IAFF (Association). In relevant part, 
the ALJ held after a hearing that the City violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when its 
Mayor, Marjorie Chomyszak, refused to execute a writing embodying 
the agreements reached by the parties in collective negotiations. 
The City argues in its exceptions that the record 
establishes that the parties were not engaged in collective 
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negotiations, only informal discussions, to which the statutory 
duty to execute a written agreement upon demand never 
attached.-7 It argues additionally that the parties did not 
reach an agreement in fact. Finally, the City alleges that the 
Association understood that any agreements which were reached 
were subject to the Common Council's acceptance. As the Common 
Council rejected the agreement, the City argues that its Mayor 
had no duty to execute a written document. The Association 
argues in response that the AKJ's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are correct. Having reviewed the record and 
the parties' briefs, and having heard oral argument, we affirm 
the AKJ's decision. 
As to the City's first exception, our review of the record 
persuades us that, notwithstanding the informality of the 
parties' meetings, they were plainly negotiating for a collective 
bargaining agreement. The City's argument to the contrary rests 
upon a hand-written note drafted by Chomyszak and signed by 
Robert Wightman, the Association's president, at the parties' 
first meeting. The writing states as follows: 
If the "kitchen table" process does not result in 
a contract agreement, further negotiations shall 
be treated as though this never happened. 
-Section 2 04.3 of the Act defines the duty to negotiate in good 
faith to include "the execution of a written agreement incorpora-
ting any agreement reached if requested by either party ...." 
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This stipulation cannot reasonably be read to mean that the 
parties were not engaged in negotiations within the meaning of 
the Act. The Act does not necessitate any degree of formality in 
collective negotiations nor does it impose any specific format 
for them. The parties' ground rule agreement merely gave them an 
escape hatch. If their meetings were unsuccessful and did not lead 
to a collective bargaining agreement, their earlier discussions and 
tentative agreements would be totally disregarded in any more 
formal, subsequent negotiations. However, as discussed below, the 
meetings did produce an agreement and the parties were never put in 
a position to use the escape hatch afforded them by their ground 
rule. 
Contrary to the City's arguments in support of its second 
exception, the meetings between the Mayor and the Association's 
representatives also plainly resulted in an agreement within the 
meaning of the Act.-7 There can be no reasonable argument to 
the contrary if for no other reason than the Mayor's repeated 
-'An agreement is defined in §201.12 of the Act as follows: 
The term "agreement" means the result of the 
exchange of mutual promises between the chief 
executive officer of a public employer and an 
employee organization which becomes a binding 
contract, for the period set forth therein, except 
as to any provisions therein which require 
approval by a legislative body, and as to those 
provisions, shall become binding when the 
appropriate legislative body gives its approval. 
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admissions during her testimony that she had reached an agreement 
with the Association. 
Having admittedly reached an agreement with the Association, 
the Mayor was obligated to execute, upon the Association's 
demand, a document embodying the agreements reached unless that 
duty was conditioned, in this case, upon the Common Council's 
acceptance of the agreement. 
The parties' arguments in this latter respect once again 
require us to differentiate between ratification and legislative 
approval. As we explained recently in some detail in Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of Buffalo,-7 
a right to ratify belongs to the negotiators and stems from the 
negotiators' reservation of that right. The right and duty of a 
legislative body to legislatively approve certain terms of an 
agreement arises by statute and exists independently of any 
action by the negotiators. The chief executive officer's duty to 
execute can be conditioned upon ratification or legislative 
approval by agreement to that effect.-7 Therefore, the Mayor 
could properly decline to execute a document containing the 
agreements reached with the Association only if she had 
conditioned her duty to execute by a course of conduct or 
understanding, either express or implied, which makes clear that 
^24 PERB 53033 (1991) (appeal pending). 
^Watkins Glen Cent. School Dist., 23 PERB ^3035 (1990). 
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"the parties"were fully aware of the condition and acquiesced in 
it."-7 The ALJ thoroughly considered this issue in her decision 
and concluded that the Mayor had not conditioned the contract 
upon ratification or other approval by the Common Council. 
Having reviewed this aspect of the City's exceptions, we affirm 
the ALJ's findings for the reasons stated in her decision. 
Whether and to what extent, however, the parties' agreements are 
now subject to legislative approval and whether they are binding 
in whole or in part are not issues for our consideration in the 
context of this improper practice charge because they concern 
only the enforceability of the document.-7 The City satisfies 
its statutory duty to negotiate in good faith by the execution by 
the Mayor of a document embodying the terms of the parties' 
agreements reached in their meetings which concluded on October 
r 
30, 1990. 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that, upon the Association's 
demand, the City's chief executive officer shall execute a 
collective bargaining agreement embodying the terms reached with 
the Association on October 30, 1990 and the attached notice be 
signed and posted at all locations ordinarily used to post 
^Capital Dist. Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 2 0 PERB f3020, 
at 3034 (1987) . 
^Citv of Dunkirk, 25 PERB «p029 (June 2, 1992). 
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informational notices to the employees in the unit represented by 
the Association. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
EW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees of the City of Norwich within the unit 
represented by the Norwich Fire Fighters' Association, Local 
1404, IAFF that, upon the Association's demand, the City's chief 
executive officer shall execute an agreement embodying the terms 
reached with the Association on October 30, 1990. 
CITY OF NORWICH 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
?K-08/25/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12614 
STATE OF NEW YORK-UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
SCHLACHTER AND MAURO (DAVID SCHLACHTER of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
HOWARD A. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ. (NORMA MEACHAM of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Suffolk 
County Court Employees Association (Association) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, the ALJ 
dismissed the Association's charge against the State of New York-
Unified Court System (UCS) which alleges that UCS violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it reduced from four to three the number of officers 
assigned to jury sequestration detail. Although the staffing 
reduction caused a proportionate reduction in the amount of 
unassigned time available to each officer on the detail, the ALJ 
held that the staffing reduction was not mandatorily negotiable. 
The ALJ held in that respect that the officers' time, although 
j specifically unassigned, was still work time, and that within 
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that work time, UCS was entitled to change the officers' 
assignments-7 both as a matter of statutory and contractual 
right.-1 The ALJ also rejected the Association's allegation 
that the staffing reduction caused a safety hazard, finding no 
evidence to support that contention. 
The Association's exceptions rest entirely on arguments that 
the ALJ erred in concluding that the officers' unassigned time is 
work time as opposed to duty-free time, which an employer may not 
alter unilaterally.-7 As no exceptions were taken to the ALJ's 
findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the safety 
implications of the staffing reduction, we do not consider that 
aspect of the ALJ's decision. The UCS argues in response that 
the ALJ's decision is correct in relevant respect and should be 
affirmed. We agree with UCS. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the ALJ's decision. The ALJ's decision thoroughly 
addresses the issues raised by the Association's exceptions. His 
findings of facts regarding the nature of the officers' 
unassigned time are consistent with the record in all material 
-^ Savona Cent. School Dist. , 20 PERB [^3055 (1987) . 
-
7The management rights clause in the parties' contract gives the 
UCS the right to "determine the ... number of personnel required 
for the conduct of state judiciary programs ... [and] to direct, 
deploy and utilize the workforce; ... ." 
-
xSee, e.cr. , Addison Cent. School Dist. , 16 PERB [^3099 (1983) . 
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respects and his conclusions of law as applied to those specific 
facts are also correct. 
The Association's exceptions are accordingly denied and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
auline R.Kinsella, Chairperson 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
^^C^^^ 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LAWRENCE CARP, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12210 
OSWEGO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
LAWRENCE CARP, pro se 
MICHAEL J. STANLEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Lawrence 
Carp to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). The 
ALT dismissed Carp's charge against the Oswego City School 
District in which he alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when he was discharged from his employment in 
September 1990. At the relevant time, Carp was working for 
the District tutoring a student who was an inpatient at a 
local hospital. Carp alleges that he was discharged because 
he tried to form a union to assist him with complaints he had 
about the presence of tobacco smoke in the employees' break 
room. After a hearing, the ALT held that Carp was terminated 
because Marc Kuehn, the Educational Coordinator for an 
adolescent unit at the hospital at which Carp was tutoring, 
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determined that Carp's services were no longer therapeutic for 
his student. 
Carp alleges in his exceptions that it was the District's 
burden to establish that his discharge was proper because his 
work was satisfactory, that the ALT improperly relied on 
Kuehn's hearsay testimony regarding a conversation Kuehn had 
with the student, and that he was wrongly denied a subpoena 
for other persons who could testify about his efforts to form 
a union. The District in a brief response urges affirmance of 
the ALJ's decision. We concur and affirm the ALT's decision. 
The ALJ credited Kuehn's testimony that he was unaware of 
Carp's efforts to form a union, and that this played no part 
in his decision to end Carp's services. Having reviewed the 
record, we find no basis on which to reverse the ALJ's 
credibility resolution. Therefore, the District satisfied the 
burden of proof Carp ascribed to it. 
Whether or not Kuehn's testimony regarding his 
conversation with the student is characterized as hearsay, the 
ALJ was entitled to rely upon it as one of the bases for his 
decision. The ALJ's denial of a subpoena also cannot be the 
basis for a successful appeal in this case. Carp wanted 
a list of the names, addresses and phone numbers of all 
teachers the District had sent to work at the hospital from 
September 12 to September 20, 1990. Carp gave no indication 
to the ALT of facts which these unidentified persons might 
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provide at a hearing. Rather, as the ALJ ruled, Carp intended 
to use the list as a discovery device through which he could 
investigate whether there was any evidence in support of his 
claims of impropriety. 
Carp alleges in his exceptions that the ALJ erred in 
denying the subpoena for the teacher list for two reasons. 
First, he alleges that there were persons he had spoken to 
about a union who could testify in that regard at the hearing. 
The ALJ, however, did not dismiss the charge because Carp 
failed to prove involvement in protected activities. 
Therefore, the ALT's ruling denying him the subpoena was not 
prejudicial to Carp on the first basis alleged by him. In 
addition, Carp alleges for the first time in his exceptions to 
us that these persons "could have testified to the spying done 
by Mark [sic] Kuehn." Carp never alleged this to the ALJ. In 
such circumstances, not having made the "spying" allegation to 
the ALJ, Carp's request for the subpoena was properly 
denied.-7 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
-'See Nanuet Union Free School Dist. , 17 PERB 5[3005 (1984) . 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Cha: irperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
">fs£>& 
Eric 3/. Schmertz, Member 
2M-08/25/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12083 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
JAMES P. KEMENASH, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (LAUREN DeSOLE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York 
State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, the ALJ 
dismissed PEF's charge against the State of New York (Department 
of Correctional Services) (State), which alleges that the State 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it terminated the probationary 
employment of Russell Armato, a PEF officer. PEF alleges that 
Armato, an employee at the maximum security Sullivan Correctional 
Facility, was terminated because he protested the assignment of a 
nonunit employee to certain summer work reserved to PEF unit 
employees. The ALJ found, however, that Armato was terminated 
because he had a history of security violations and had displayed 
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a negative attitude regarding the seriousness of those 
violations. 
PEF has filed two exceptions to the ALJ's decision; First, 
it alleges that, contrary to the ALJ's finding, a June 19, 1990 
memorandum from Armato to Edward Tucker, Deputy Superintendent of 
Programs, did not and could not play any role in the State's 
decision to terminate him.-7 PEF also alleges that the ALT 
dismissed the charges because there was no demonstrated union 
animus and that this was error because animus is not required to 
establish a violation of §209-a.l(a) or (c). 
The State argues in response that the ALJ's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are correct and that her decision should 
be affirmed. We agree. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the ALJ's finding that 
the June 19, 1990 memorandum from Armato to Tucker was a factor 
in the State's decision to terminate Armato. Tucker's July 29, 
1990 memorandum to Robert H. Kuhlmann, Superintendent of the 
Sullivan Correctional Facility, in which he recommends Armato's 
termination attaches the June 19, 1990 memorandum, which was also 
included in the packet of information Kuhlmann sent to the 
central office in Albany which was reviewing Kuhlmann's 
recommendation for Armato's termination. 
-
7As summarized by the ALJ, Armato expresses in the memorandum 
his "'frustration7 and 'anger' ... stating that [a correction 
officer's complaint] was 'an insult to his intelligence' ... 
costly 'nonsense' and that the correction officer who filed the 
report of the breach [should] be designated 'Lock-Box Officer'." 
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PEF alleges that the State should not be permitted to use 
Armato7s June 19, 1990 memorandum to support his discharge 
because the memorandum was not part of his official personal 
history folder. The issue under this charge, however, is the 
State's motivation for its termination. The ALJ found that the 
State was motivated to discharge Armato, in part, by his attitude 
as exemplified by the June 19, 1990 memorandum. The alleged 
inadmissibility of that document in a contract disciplinary 
proceeding is immaterial to the ALJ's consideration of it in 
assessing the State's motivation. 
In regard to PEF's second exception, the ALJ found that 
neither Kuhlmann nor Tucker had any union animus. The ALJ, 
however, did not dismiss the charge on this basis. The charge 
was dismissed because Armato's protected activities were found 
not to be the reason for his termination. As PEF correctly 
argues, it is possible for an employee's discharge to violate 
§209-a.l(a) or (c) of the Act even if the actors responsible for 
the discharge bear no union animus, either generally or 
specifically. An animus finding is essentially evidentiary. A 
finding of animus helps to establish the requisite causation. On 
the other hand, the absence of animus can help to negate an 
inference or finding that an action was motivated improperly by 
the employee's exercise of statutorily protected rights. In this 
case, the ALJ's finding that neither Tucker nor Kuhlmann had 
animus merely buttressed her ultimate conclusion that Armato's 
termination was not caused by his exercise of statutorily 
protected rights. 
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For the reasons set forth above, PEF's exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, ulm
Us. 
Chairperson 
WaJJter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Membe 
2N-8/25/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, GREENE COUNTY 
LOCAL 82 0, CAIRO-DURHAM CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12449 
CAIRO-DURHAM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
RUBERTI, GIRVIN & FERLAZZO (JAMES E. GIRVIN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Cairo-
Durham Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed against the 
District by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Greene County Local 82 0, Cairo-
Durham Central School District Unit (CSEA). CSEA alleges in its 
charge that the District violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it eliminated 
several food service positions in CSEA's unit and hired a food 
service contractor to perform those duties. 
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The ALT dismissed the §209-a.l(e) allegation for failure of 
proof and no exceptions have been filed to this aspect of his 
decision. The ALT held, however, that the District had violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act as alleged when it subcontracted the 
daytime student cafeteria program to a private contractor. In 
reaching this conclusion, the ALT found that CSEA had not waived 
its bargaining rights. 
The District argues that the ALT erred by finding 
jurisdiction over the §209-a.l(d) allegation. Alternatively, the 
District argues that the ALT should have required CSEA to file a 
grievance, thereby deferring consideration of the merits of the 
charge to the parties7 grievance procedure. Assuming the merits 
are to be reached, the District argues that the ALT erred when he 
fashioned a discernible boundary to the unit work. The District 
argues in this respect that food preparation and service 
appropriately defines unit work and that CSEA's nonexclusivity 
over evening banquets destroyed its exclusivity over the daytime 
cafeteria program. The District's several remaining exceptions 
concern the ALT's conclusion that CSEA had not waived any further 
bargaining over subcontracting. It argues that the language of 
the parties' contract and the negotiating history of the relevant 
contract clause show that CSEA understood and agreed that the 
District could subcontract the cafeteria operation in whole or in 
part under certain circumstances. 
Board - U-12449 -3 
CSEA argues in its response that the ALJ's procedural 
rulings and substantive findings of fact and law are correct in 
all material respects. 
Preliminarily, we affirm the ALJ's decisions on jurisdiction 
and deferral for the reasons set forth in his decision. The 
contract has not been arguably violated by the subcontract. 
CSEA's rights in this respect, therefore, do not stem from the 
contract nor is there anything in the contract which it could 
grieve. The contract's relevancy is confined to the District's 
waiver defense, a claim which rests plainly within our 
jurisdiction to decide. 
We similarly affirm the ALJ's exclusivity determination. 
CSEA's exclusivity over the daytime cafeteria operation is 
established in the record. Although the unit work may generally 
be defined as food preparation and service, there can be 
boundaries within that perimeter within which CSEA may have 
maintained exclusivity. The ALJ's determination that there was a 
discernible boundary between the regular cafeteria program for 
students and evening banquets is one consistent with discernible 
boundaries we have recognized in other cases.-7 We find it 
particularly persuasive in this respect that banquet work is 
considered extra duty work under the parties' contract. By this 
ly,See, e.g. , Spencer-VanEtten Cent. School Dist.
 r 21 PERB 5[3 015 
(1987); Town of West Seneca, 19 PERB ^3028 (1986). 
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differentiation, it appears that the parties themselves have 
recognized that there is a distinction between the student 
cafeteria program and the evening banquets. Banquets fall within 
one boundary of the unit work; daytime cafeteria in another. 
Nonexclusivity over the former does not impair the exclusivity 
established and maintained over the latter. 
The District's waiver defense as raised in its answer is 
premised specifically upon a waiver by agreement, in this case 
Article XXII of the parties' 1990-93 agreement captioned 
"Cafeteria". That clause provides as follows: 
Salary increases given to the cafeteria workers 
are dependent upon the cafeteria operating at a profit 
without any increase in the cost of lunches to the 
students attributable to salaries. In the event that 
the cafeteria fails to operate at a profit during any 
calendar month of the school year, the Board of 
Education reserves the right to close the cafeteria and 
layoff the employees or to layoff any number of 
employees so as to maintain the cafeteria at a self-
sustaining basis. 
There is no dispute that the cafeteria has not operated at a 
profit for some time. Nor is there any dispute that Article XXII 
gives the District at least two options. It is agreed that the 
District can close the cafeteria and lay off all of the cafeteria 
employees. It is also agreed that the District may keep the 
cafeteria open, running it with a fewer number of District 
employees. The District argues, however, that Article XXII also 
gives it the right to keep the cafeteria open and operating under 
other means, including a subcontract, with the concomitant right 
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to lay off all of its employees in favor of that subcontracting 
relationship. CSEA denies that the parties' contract, as either 
written or intended, reserves a right to the District to 
subcontract the cafeteria operation. 
The ALJ held that Article XXII did not confer upon the 
District the right to subcontract. Finding that this right was 
clearly denied it by Article XXII, the ALJ invoked the parol 
evidence rule-7 and refused to consider any testimony offered to 
establish the meaning of the contract language. Therefore, the 
ALJ did not resolve a possible conflict in the testimony of the 
parties7 several witnesses concerning whether and to what extent 
subcontracting was discussed during negotiations as an option 
available under Article XXII. Continuing his analysis 
thereafter, however, the ALJ held that the requisite clear and 
unmistakable waiver-7 was not established even if the 
credibility dispute were resolved in favor of the District's 
witnesses. In that respect, the ALJ stated that CSEA was merely 
silent in the face of an articulated opinion about a hypothetical 
event. 
-''The parol evidence rule provides that a contract which is clear 
in its terms and purports to express the parties' entire 
agreement cannot be contradicted, varied or explained by evidence 
of the parties' prior or contemporaneous communications. See 58 
N.Y. Jur.2d Evidence and Witnesses §§555-618 (1986); Fisch, 
New York Evidence, §§41-64 (2d ed. 1977). 
g/CSEA v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 57011 (3d Dep't 1982), 
aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 1001, 17 PERB [^7007 (1984). 
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We do not agree that Article XXII is so plain and clear 
regarding the District's subcontracting rights as to warrant the 
exclusion of testimony concerning the negotiating history of that 
provision.-7 For example only, the District's right to lay off 
"any" number of employees, is arguably consistent with the right 
to lay off all employees.-7 The second half of the last 
sentence of Article XXII contemplates that the cafeteria would 
remain open in conjunction with a layoff of "any" unit employees. 
A subcontract may have been contemplated as one of the means 
through which the cafeteria could remain open despite the layoff 
of all unit cafeteria staff. We do not suggest that this is 
necessarily the correct interpretation of Article XXII, only that 
such a construction is not so plainly precluded by the language 
of Article XXII as to entitle the ALJ to exclude from 
consideration the relevant negotiating history in its 
interpretation. 
Although the ALJ gave an alternative basis for the rejection 
of the District's waiver defense in which he assumes the truth of 
his summary of the testimony of the District's witnesses, we do 
not consider this sufficient to avoid the necessity for a remand. 
Having rejected any consideration of the parties' negotiating 
^For example, in Village of Port Chester, 18 PERB ^3 058 (1985), 
the Board held that the term "laborer" in an agreement was not so 
plain and clear as to prohibit parol evidence. 
-
7The word "any" has been regarded as an all-exclusive word 
meaning "all" or."every". Randall v. Baileyr 288 N.Y. 208 
(1942); Shilburv v. Bd. of Supervisors, 54 Misc.2d 979 (1967). 
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history, the ALJ's summary of the relevant negotiating history 
does not necessarily reflect all of the evidence with respect to 
the question of whether there was an agreement between the 
parties which permitted the District to subcontract the cafeteria 
operation. That evidence may properly include not only 
statements made by the parties during negotiations, but the 
context in which those negotiations took place, including actions 
the parties may or may not have taken. The District's brief 
refers to several examples of what it considers relevant 
negotiating history, but certain of these are not reflected in 
the ALJ's decision. The case is, therefore, appropriately 
remanded for consideration of all relevant facts in light of the 
negotiating history of Article XXII. 
Having determined that a remand is appropriate, the remand 
should also include a resolution of the credibility issue which 
the ALJ left open. This will permit the case to be reviewed and 
decided on the basis of specific findings of fact. Although the 
case might eventually be decided on the law, a remand without a 
directive for a credibility resolution would present the 
possibility of a third appeal. The parties' interests argue 
strongly against that result. 
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For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
the case be remanded to the ALT for decision in accordance with 
the terms of our decision herein. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
fcJ^ *L tlr^fU 
Paul ine R. KinselJ .a , Chairperson 
Walter>ir. E i senbe rg , Meml/er 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AUBURN EDUCATIONAL SECRETARIES AND AIDES 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12320 
AUBURN ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
HARRY SLYWIAK, for Charging Party 
MATTHEW R. FLETCHER, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Auburn Enlarged City School District (District) has 
filed exceptions to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
determination on a charge filed by the Auburn Educational 
Secretaries and Aides Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association) which alleges that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
unilaterally amending its health insurance policy regarding 
retirees. 
The exceptions raise no questions of fact, only that the ALJ 
misapplied existing law. Specifically, the District asserts that 
the ALJ applied too narrow a contract waiver standard; that the 
ALJ erred by finding a reduction in benefits because no unit 
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employee had been adversely affected to the date of the hearing; 
that the charge is untimely;-7 and that the ALT incorrectly 
extended the duty to negotiate in good faith to legislative 
action. The District also excepts to the ALT's remedy. In that 
respect, the District argues that PERB is without authority to 
order the rescission of a resolution adopted by the District's 
legislative body and it objects to the reimbursement order on the 
basis that no current unit employee was shown to have been 
harmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the District's 
exceptions, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The District and the Association are parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement effective July 1, 1989 to June 30, 1992. 
The District bases its contract waiver defense on Articles XIII 
and XII-7 of that agreement, respectively entitled Duration and 
Signatory and Management's Rights, most specifically, the 
-'The District has filed a separate exception claiming that the 
record facts also show a waiver by conduct. However, in the 
brief accompanying its exceptions, the District refers to such a 
waiver only in support of its timeliness defense, which is the 
same context in which it appeared in the brief to the ALT. No 
waiver by conduct defense was raised in the District's answer to 
the charge and we do not consider it except in the context of the 
timeliness defense. 
-'Although Article XII is not specifically raised in the 
District's answer to the charge, both parties addressed that 
clause in the contract waiver context in their briefs to the ALT 
and the ALT dealt with it in his decision. 
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following language: 
...the District and the Association, for the 
life of this agreement, each voluntarily and 
unqualifiedly waives the right, and each 
agrees that the other shall not be obligated, 
to negotiate collectively with respect to any 
subject or matter not specifically referred 
to or covered in this agreement, even though 
such subjects or matter may not have been 
within the knowledge or contemplation of 
either or both of the parties at the time 
they negotiated or signed this agreement.-7 
and: 
The Association recognizes the exclusive 
right and authority of the school district to 
manage its operations including, but not 
limited to, the following rights: to 
supervise all employees and determine 
reasonable standards of performance; to 
assign work and transfer employees; to 
determine the hours of work, shift schedules 
and amounts of overtime.-7 
We rejected a contract waiver defense based upon similar 
clauses in Onondaga-Madison BOCES-7 and we find no material 
difference in language warranting a different result here. The 
District's reliance on Sweet Home Central School District-7 and 
Sachem Central School District-7 is misplaced. The contract 
language in those cases explicitly reserved to the employer the 
right to make changes unilaterally during the duration of the 
57From Section 1 of Article XIII. 
^Section 1 of Article XII. 
^
713 PERB f3015 (1980), conf'd, 82 A.D.2d 691, 14 PERB 17025 (3d 
Dep't 1981). 
^
714 PERB 14585 (1981) . 
7
-'2\ PERB 13021 (1988) . 
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collective bargaining agreement.-f No such specific reservation 
of right exists here, either in the language quoted or in 
Articles XIII and XII when viewed in their entirety, either 
separately or together. Article XIII sets forth a waiver of the 
right of either party to negotiate on demand for the duration of 
the agreement on matters not covered by the agreement. It does 
not establish a waiver of the right to object to a unilateral 
change in practice involving a mandatory subj ect of negotiation 
in effect when the contract was negotiated.-'' Article XII's 
preservation of management rights in certain defined areas, none 
related to health insurance, is no more a waiver than 
Article XIII because a general contract right to manage 
operations does not extend to a right to make unilateral changes 
in mandatorily negotiable employment practices. 
The District's exception to the AKJ's invocation of CSEA v. 
Newman—7 is rejected. The ALT properly cited CSEA v. Newman 
regarding the legal standard for waiver in general. In any event, 
the ALJ did not cite that case in the context of his discussion 
-
;The relevant language in both cases reserved to the employer 
the "direction and control" of noncontractual terms and 
conditions of employment. See Sweet Home Cent. School Dist., 
supra note 6 at 4679 and Sachem Cent. School Dist., supra note 7 
at 3041. 
^Onondaga-Madison BOCES, supra note 5. 
^
788 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 57011 (3d Dep't 1982), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 
1001, 17 PERB ^7007 (1984). 
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of the District's contractual waiver defense.—7 Therefore, the 
District's distinction of CSEA v. Newman on its facts is 
unavailing. 
The ALJ's determination that the unit has suffered a loss of 
benefit is also correct, it being undisputed that employees 
retiring under the existing bargaining agreement would receive 
reduced health insurance benefits as a result of the District's 
change in policy. Neither allegation nor proof of actual harm to 
a specific employee on or before the charge is filed or heard is 
required; it is sufficient that an identifiable reduction in an 
available economic fringe benefit has occurred.—7 
As to timeliness, the District does not argue that the 
charge is untimely filed with respect to the at-issue 
December 10, 1990 board of education resolution, which falls 
clearly within PERB's four-month filing period,—7 but argues 
that it is untimely as to the board of education's resolutions of 
February 12 and July 2, 1990. As the ALJ found, however, the 
charge objects only to the December 10, 1990 resolution, which is 
admittedly different from the earlier resolutions. The charge 
is, therefore, timely filed as to the December 10, 1990 change. 
—
7The case was cited by the ALT in his discussion of whether the 
unit president's failure to demand negotiations after the 
District's refusal to respond to her inquiries constituted a 
waiver. 
-
/Seef e.g., Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth.f 18 PERB 53083 
(1985). 
-^
7Rules of Procedure, §204 .1 (a) (1) . 
Board - U-12320 -6 
The District's attempt to support its timeliness defense 
with arguments related to waiver by conduct is without merit. 
Waiver and timeliness are unrelated concepts. An improper 
practice charge is not rendered untimely because a charging party 
might be found to have previously waived its right to negotiate. 
Rather, the waiver would, if properly raised in defense to timely 
allegations of impropriety, cause the charging party to lose the 
case on the merits. As the District did not raise a waiver by 
conduct defense before the ALJ, it is not properly before us 
here. We note, however, that the resolutions on which the 
District relies do not evidence such a waiver. The 
February 12, 1990 resolution and its July 2, 1990 readoption 
merely cover contractual health insurance provisions, not health 
insurance past practices as are involved in this case. The 
record testimony, which indicates that before December 10, 1990 
the District paid 100% of the health insurance premiums for which 
unit retirees would otherwise be responsible, and the District's 
passage of the December 10, 1990 resolution itself, support the 
conclusion that the earlier resolutions did not waive any rights 
associated with the December 10, 1990 resolution. Even assuming 
that the District had intended the language of those earlier 
resolutions to effectuate the loss of benefits at issue here, 
their wording would not put the Association on notice of that 
intent and there is no claim or record evidence that such intent 
was otherwise communicated to the Association. Under such 
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circumstances, the Association's lack of response to those 
resolutions would not constitute a waiver by conduct. 
The District's apparent claim that the legislative body's 
initiation of the at-issue change and its historical grant of 
health insurance benefits for retirees defeats the charge is also 
rejected.—/ This claim was not raised before the ALJ and it 
is, therefore, not properly before us. Even if considered on its 
merits, it would be rejected. It is undisputed that the District 
implemented the board of education's December 10, 1990 
resolution, going so far as to call a meeting of all employees 
eligible to retire, where, with other administrative personnel 
present, the superintendent of schools notified them of the 
implementation. Having implemented the board of education's 
resolution, the District cannot disassociate itself from it for 
purposes of the Act. 
As to remedy, we need not treat with the District's argument 
that the rescission of a legislative resolution is beyond PERB's 
authority.—'' The ALJ's order ran to the executive, not the 
—'Any claim that the charge must be dismissed because it alleges 
merely that the legislative resolution violated the Act would be 
rejected. The charge, filed after the effective date of the 
resolution, alleges that the resolution resulted in a change in 
retirees' health insurance, and the parties understood the charge 
to have addressed the resolution as implemented because they 
litigated and briefed the case on that basis. 
—
7As to orders regarding legislative resolutions, see, e.g., 
County of Suffolk, 15 PERB J[3021 (1991) , where, pursuant to a 
determination that the legislative body had violated §209-a.l(a) 
of the Act, it was ordered to cease passing legislative 
resolutions granting step advancements. 
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legislative, branch and contemplates only that the District cease 
implementation of the resolution. Clarification of that portion 
of the order in response to the District's exceptions, however, 
is warranted. The ALJ's order must also be modified—7 because 
not all relevant portions of the December 10, 1990 resolution 
were addressed.—7 
The District's claim that the earlier 1990 resolutions 
control such benefits is rejected. As stated infra, for purposes 
of the Act, those resolutions cover contractual benefits only, 
not, as here, health insurance benefits established pursuant to 
past practice. 
Finally, the District's exception to the ALJ's reimbursement 
order is rejected on the same grounds as set forth in State of 
New York CDMNA).^7 
Based on the above, the District's exceptions are denied, 
the decision of the AKT is affirmed and the remedial order 
modified as follows below. 
—
7Rules of Procedure §204.14(a)(1) permits us to review the 
remedial order on our own motion. That power to review is 
necessary to ensure that any order fully remedies the violation 
found and that it otherwise satisfies the policies of the Act as 
required by §205.5(d) of the Act. 
—
7The ALJ did not include in his order paragraph four of the 
resolution, which repealed not only a June 25, 1973 board of 
education resolution covering unit retirees' health insurance 
benefits, but also other prior board of education policies which 
may affect such benefits. 
-^24 PERB J3024 (1991) . 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Immediately cease implementation of all portions of the 
December 10, 1990 resolution of its board of education 
which reduced the health insurance benefits of unit 
employees who retired or may retire during the duration 
of the District/Association 1989-1992 collective 
bargaining agreement and restore to them for the 
duration of that agreement the health insurance 
benefits they previously enjoyed. 
2. Reimburse any unit employees who have retired since 
January 1, 1991 for any monies expended by them for 
maintenance of health insurance benefits because of the 
implementation of the December 10, 1990 resolution, 
with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used by the District to post written 
communications to unit employees. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees in the unit represented by Auburn 
Educational Secretaries and Aides Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-
CIO (Association), that the Auburn Enlarged City School District 
(District) will: 
1. Immediately cease implementation of all 
portions of the December 10, 1990 resolution 
of its board of education which reduced the 
health insurance benefits of unit employees 
who retired or may retire during the duration 
of the District/Association 1989-1992 
collective bargaining agreement and restore 
to them for the duration of that agreement 
the health insurance benefits they previously 
enjoyed. 
2. Reimburse any unit employees who have retired , 
since January 1, 1991 for any monies expended 
by them for maintenance of health insurance 
benefits because of the implementation of the 
December 10, 1990 resolution, with interest 
at the maximum legal rate. 
AUBURN ENLARGED. CITY.SCHOOL.DISTRICT 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered. 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-12394 & 
U-12452 
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE 
OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS), 
Respondent. 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD J. DAUTNER Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (FREDERICK K. REICH of 
counsel), for Amicus Curiae New York State United Teachers, 
New York City Office 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision by the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on two 
charges PEF filed against the State of New York (Governor's Office 
of Employee Relations) (State). In the first charge (U-12394), PEF 
alleges that the State failed to continue Article 10 (Employee 
Benefit Fund) (EBF) of the parties' 1989-91 contract in violation 
of §209-a.l(e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
PEF alleges in that same charge that the State failed despite 
request to inform it regarding its intent to continue funding of 
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the EBF in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. The totality of 
the State's conduct is alleged to have violated §209-a.l(b) of the 
Act. PEF alleges in its second charge (U-12452) that the State 
repudiated Articles 7.9 (Performance Advances) and 7.10 
(Performance Awards) of the 1989-91 contract in violation of §209-
a.l(d) and (e) of the Act. The timing and totality of the State's 
action in these respects is alleged to have violated §209-a.l(a), 
1 
(b) and (d) . 
The Director dismissed both charges in their entirety. He 
held that the State had no obligation to continue Articles 10, 7.9 
or 7.10 beyond the stated term of the contract because the benefits 
expired or "sunsetted"-/ according to the contract. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Director cited and relied upon only the 
language of the contract, denying PEF an opportunity to offer proof 
regarding the meaning or history of the contract. Although he 
found that the State had admittedly delayed making those few 
performance award payments which became fixed on March 31, 1991, 
the last day of the stated term of the 1989-91 contract, the 
Director held that this was an arguable contract breach, not a 
J-'A sunset clause is one which we have held terminates a benefit 
at a specific time or upon a specified condition, most often 
expiration of the stated term of the contract. A sunsetted 
benefit does not form part of the status quo which an employer is 
obligated to maintain under either §209-a.l(d) or (e). Yonkers 
City School Dist. . 12 PERB f3127 (1979) ; Suffolk County, 18 PERB 
53030 (1985), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Faculty Ass'n of 
Suffolk Community College v. PERB, 18 PERB f7016 (Sup. Ct. 
Suffolk County, 1985), aff'd, 125 A.D.2d 307, 20 PERB J[7002 (2d 
Dep't 1986). 
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repudiation, which was not within our jurisdiction under §205.5(d) 
of the Act. The Director dismissed the refusal to bargain 
allegation premised upon PEF's demand for information on a finding 
that the State's responses to PEF's inquiries were not proven to be 
false. 
PEF takes exception to every aspect of the Director's decision 
which addresses its §209-a.l(e) allegations, including his refusal 
to allow evidence regarding the meaning and history of the disputed 
contract provisions. PEF excepts also to the Director's dismissal 
of its allegations regarding the demand for information about the 
continued funding of the EBF and the repudiation of Articles 7.9 
and 7.10. Certain incidental determinations made by the Director 
are also made the subject of PEF's exceptions, but these do not 
require elaboration in this decision. 
The State argues in response that the Director correctly 
dismissed all of PEF's allegations and arguments. The State has, 
however, filed a cross-exception contingent upon our reversal of 
the Director's decision regarding the State's obligation to 
continue either Article 7.9 or 7.10. The State argues under its 
exception that the Director erred in dismissing its defense 
grounded upon 1972 N.Y. Laws, ch. 282, §63(2).-1 The State argues 
-'That statute provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of this Act 
or of any other law, after March 31, 1973, all 
increases of salary and compensation based on time in 
service shall be negotiated pursuant to article 14 of 
the civil service law. 
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that this statute is inconsistent with the obligations PEF would 
impose upon the State under its interpretation of §209-a..l(e) of 
the Act. The inconsistency is irreconcilable according to the 
State, such that the former statute must prevail over the latter. 
The New York State United Teachers (NYSUT), through its Office 
of General Counsel, New York City Office, has filed an amicus 
curiae brief urging that the Court of Appeals' recent decision in 
Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters v. State of 
New York-7 (hereafter Surrogates II) necessitates a reevaluation 
of our §209-a.l(e) case law, including that involving sunset 
provisions. PEF and the State also rely upon Surrogates II in 
support of their arguments on the merits of PEF's allegations 
against the State. 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) have recognized in certain 
recent decisions-7 that Surrogates II raises preliminary questions 
regarding our jurisdiction over §209-a.l(e) allegations generally 
and over those §2 09-a.l(d) allegations which are premised upon 
^79 N.Y.2d 39, 25 PERB [^7502 (1992). 
-
7Three ALJs have held that Surrogates II divests us of 
jurisdiction over refusal to bargain charges filed pursuant to 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act which are premised upon a unilateral 
change in a mandatory subject of negotiation which is 
incorporated into a contract which has expired according to its 
terms. Watkins Glen Cent. School Dist., 25 PERB 54610 (August 4, 
1992) ; New York City Transit Auth. , 25 PERB [^4584 (June 5, 1992) ; 
Baldwinsville Cent. School Dist. , 25 PERB [^4582 (June 3, 1992). 
The ALJ in New York City Transit Auth. also opined in dicta that 
Surrogates II does not affect the Board's improper practice 
jurisdiction under §209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
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unilateral changes in the mandatorily negotiable terms contained in 
a contract which has expired according to its terms. PEF's 
§209-a.l(d) allegations, however, which are based upon a refusal to 
provide information and a repudiation of contract, do not raise any 
relevant jurisdictional issues. Therefore, we need not consider in 
this case the effect of Surrogates II upon our unilateral change 
jurisdiction under §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
Surrogates II also has implications for purposes of assessing 
whether a cognizable cause of action can still be pleaded under 
§209-a.l(e). The issue Surrogates II poses for the improper 
practice defined in §209-a.l(e) is raised by the definition of the 
violation itself. Section 2 09-a.l(e) makes it improper for an 
employer to refuse to continue all terms of an "expired agreement" 
until a new agreement is negotiated. As Surrogates II holds that 
§2 09-a.l(e) of the Act keeps the parties' contract in effect beyond 
its stated term, at least for certain purposes, an argument can be 
made that the parties' contract in this case has not "expired" such 
that PEF cannot establish the element of an "expired agreement" 
which is necessary to the cause of action under §209-a.l(e) as the 
Legislature has defined that violation.-7 The parties, however, 
-
7The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) has filed a proposed amicus curiae brief 
on these issues. PEF opposes CSEA's participation as an amicus. 
It has, however, separately briefed the threshold Surrogates II 
issues after having received CSEA's amicus brief in anticipation 
of the possibility that we would reach these issues at this time. 
Board - U-12394 & U-12452 -6 
did not raise this issue to the Director and he did not address the 
question. Moreover, the exceptions to the Director's decision do 
not raise this issue. Although it may, nonetheless, be necessary 
and appropriate at a later date to consider the effect of 
Surrogates II upon causes of action pleaded under §209-a.l(e) of 
the Act, it is not necessary to decide that issue now because we 
must remand the case to the Director for further hearing and 
decision. 
Having reviewed PEF's exceptions, we grant those concerning 
the Director's exclusion of evidence regarding the history and 
meaning of the contract articles in issue. Unlike the Director, we 
do not consider any of the contract provisions in this case to be 
so clear and unambiguous regarding the parties' intent to continue 
those benefits post-expiration of the contract as to prohibit the 
introduction of relevant parol evidence.-7 We do not address any 
of the parties' other exceptions or arguments.-7 New exceptions 
and such of the present exceptions as remain relevant after the 
Director's decision following remand may be raised to us at the 
appropriate later date, as necessary. 
-
7Comp_are_ Hempstead Public School Dist. , 25 PERB }[3025 (1992) . 
-
7In view of our disposition of the exceptions, we do not now 
decide whether to permit CSEA's participation as an amicus. CSEA 
may renew its request after issuance of the Director's decision 
on remand. 
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For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that the cases 
are remanded to the Director for the conduct of a hearing 
consistent with this decision and for the preparation of such 
decision as is then appropriate. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Walter^ L. Eisej iberg, Member r 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VICTOR ADMINISTRATORS AND SUPERVISORS 
ASSOCIATION, SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS 
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK STATE, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3911 
VICTOR CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Victor Administrators and 
Supervisors Association, School Administrators Association of New 
York State has been designcited and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time employees in the 
following titles: Principals, Assistant 
Principals, Language Arts Coordinator, Pupil 
Personnel Services Director, Transportation 
Supervisor, Food Service Director, Supervisor 
of Buildings and Grounds, Director of Physical 
Education and Athletics. 
Excluded: Director of Finance and Operations, Assistant 
Superintendent for Instruction, Administrative 
Assistant for Personnel, and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Victor Administrators and 
Supervisors Association, School Administrators Association of New 
York State. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
^J.^^fc-Lf^l 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric J.ySchmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED INDUSTRY WORKERS, 
LOCAL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3947 
NORTH SHORE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, APL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Industry Workers, 
Local 424, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
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settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Custodial Workers, Mechanics, Bus Drivers and 
Maintenance Personnel. 
Excluded: Part-time and Summer employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the United Industry 
Workers, Local 424. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August.25-, 1992 
Albany, New York 
30-08/25/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 182, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3978 
TOWN OF NEW HARTFORD, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 182, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
found to be appropriate and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Dispatchers. 
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Excluded: All other employees in any other 
classification. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 182, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
3aailine R.' Kinsella, Chai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
3D-0 8 /25 /92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OP 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3967 
VILLAGE OF BRONXVILLE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Equipment operator, laborer, meter enforcement 
officer, parking meter repairman, village hall 
custodian, and all other regular full-time and 
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regular part-time blue collar employees 
currently or hereafter employed by the Village 
of Bronxville in the Public Works Department, 
Parking Commission Department, and Village Hall 
Department. 
Excluded: Confidential, managerial, supervisory, summer 
(seasonal), temporary, white collar, and all 
other employees employed by the Village. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
U±A x-*- ^^\r\<jJ[.\j^ Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
-'t/x^ - /j 
Eric/0". Schmertz, Member 
3E-08/25/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 182, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3962 
VILLAGE OF LIVERPOOL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 182 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Motor Equipment Operator 1, Maintenance I, and 
Laborer. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 182. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, §K Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memhrer 
Schmertz, Membe 
3F-08 /25 /92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF'S EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-39 6 0 
COUNTY OF WAYNE, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 859, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees'' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wayne County Sheriff's 
Employees Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Criminal Investigator, Sergeant, Deputy 
Corrections Officer, Dispatcher, Account Clerk, 
Sr. Account Clerk, Records Clerk, and Sr. 
Records Clerk. 
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Chief Deputy, and 
Lieutenants. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Wayne County Sheriff's 
Employees Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Ut^iJZL. &****>+^4+£? 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 693, I.B.T. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3958 
TOWN OF WALTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local Union 693, 
I.B.T. has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time employees in the following 
titles: M.E.O., H.E.O., Laborer. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local Union 693, 
I.B.T. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, t ihairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe^t 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
3H-08/25/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED INDUSTRY WORKERS, LOCAL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3952 
NORTH SHORE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Industry Workers, 
Local 42 4 has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Part-time bus drivers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Industry Workers, 
Local 424. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
4jU^ f-^4 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J/C Schmertz, Member 
31-08/25/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORANGE COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3846 
COUNTY OF ORANGE AND ORANGE COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
ORANGE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Orange County Correction 
Officers Benevolent Association has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Building Maintenance Mechanic (Sheriff), 
Correction Officer, Corrections Sergeant, 
Deputy Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff and Recruit, 
Deputy Sheriff and Sergeant, Head Jail Cook, 
Jail Cook, Maintenance Mechanic Assistant 
Supervisor (Sheriff), Maintenance Mechanic 
Supervisor (Sheriff), Principal Account Clerk 
(Sheriff), Senior Account Clerk (Sheriff), 
Telephone Operator and Cashier. 
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Jail Administrator, 
Correction Supervisor, Assistant Correction 
Supervisors, Chief Communications Officer, 
Chief Transportation Officer, Supervisor of the 
Civil Service Division and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Orange County Correction 
Officers Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
^.-.^yJt/li 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter jfc. Eisenberg, Memberv 
3J-08/25/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF SUBSTITUTES IN EDUCATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3941 
GALWAY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the School Alliance of 
Substitutes in Education, NYSUT, AFT has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who received a 
notice of reasonable assurance of continued 
employment for the 1991-92 school year. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the School Alliance of 
Substitutes in Education, NYSUT, AFT. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
3 K - 0 8 / 2 5 / 9 2 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 2 94, IBT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3937 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SEWER DISTRICT II, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters, Local 294, IBT has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Sewage treatment plant operator, sewer 
maintenance worker, sewer line and pump station 
maintainer and laborer. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters, Local 294, IBT. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, C Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membey 
